Anselm’s Ontological Argument
Can we conceive of a being so great that to disbelieve its existence only leads to absurdity? St. Anselm thinks that we understand “something greater than which nothing can be thought,” and he argues that our understanding of this being is such that we contradict ourselves upon thinking that such a being does not exist. Anselm arrives at his conclusion only by befuddling object language and metalanguage, blurring the distinction between “a being that exists” (meta) and a being that exists (object). Regardless, we see that if we take care in our interpretation of his argument, Anselm delivers sound reasoning for the possibility of such a being and a reaffirming argument for those who already believe in such a being.
Anselm’s first premise is that (A) we understand what is meant by “something than which nothing greater can be thought”1 when we hear it. (B) That which is understood exists in the understanding, and by the elimination of the universal quantifier in B and modus ponens with antecedent A, we infer that (C) God exists in our understanding. Now Anselm gives a reductio on the assumption that (D) God exists only in our understanding. Under this assumption, since (E) that which exists in reality is greater than that which exists merely in our understanding, (F) we can think of a being even greater than something than which nothing greater can be thought. This is absurd, and modus tollens propagates the absurdity to the assumption. Therefore, Anselm concludes (~D) it is not the case that God exists only in the understanding; God exists in reality.
Anselm first begins to blur the distinction between object language and metalanguage when he claims that (B) that which is understood exists in the understanding. This is the moment at which the often criticized leap from concept to being occurs. What exactly would it mean if I told you that upon hearing “eight-legged platypus” that an eight-legged platypus came into existence in your understanding? This seemingly small shuffling of words has nontrivial ontological implications, giving a conjuring of our understanding a hint of independent existence.
In the reductio, Anselm compares the God existing in our understanding (“God”) ̶what was previously just a concept ̶to an existing God. The comparison favors the existing God, and this is where we find the absurdity of the reductio. But this is not the greatest absurdity in the argument. Instead of comparing one concept to another, Anselm makes an absurd comparison between a concept of a being and the being itself. This comparison is invalid because it imports a predicate from the metalanguage to the object language in order to compare “God” to God. Clearly objects of our understanding do not exist in the same way that things do.
Notwithstanding the objection, Anselm has shown that to understand what is meant by “God” yet to think that such a being would not exist is absurd; clearly, when we conceive of God we conceive of God that exists. But how much is this worth? Does this only work for “something than which nothing greater can be thought,” or does it work for “eight-legged platypus” as well? When you conceive of the latter, does your concept include “that it exists?” If not, it sure is funny looking for something that does not exist! These questions are meant to suggest who and what Anselm’s argument is for: the argument is meant to convince people who already believe that God exists that they are correct. The fact that this argument is still in contention after a millennium suggests that Anselm was successful in this respect, and unsuccessful in giving a definitive proof for the existence of God.
- Henceforth referred to as “God” for abbreviation.
12 Comments
February 6th, 2007 at 3:01 am
Is there something intrinsically wrong with a platypus with eight legs existing? Likewise a Unicorn. What is the criteria for deciding whether some ‘thing’ exists? Do I need to, empirically, search the entire universe for such a ‘thing’?
Also, is there such a thing as a negative truth? Such as ‘there are no eight legged platypi’. Is this an ontologically sound proposition?
Lastly, what about possible worlds?
February 6th, 2007 at 3:03 am
Forgot to mention, in Tasmania at the moment, due to the extensive logging and subsequent utrification, it is entirely possible that an eight legged platypus does, in fact, exist. Even empirically.
February 6th, 2007 at 3:16 am
Simon! You’re my first commenter! Thanks, excellent thoughts.
I think “there are no eight-legged platypi” certainly has a truth value. Either there aren’t or there are. This is the same for God. Whether or not we can prove it is another issue.
About possible worlds, I’ll have to deal with that in another argument. You’re thinking of something along the lines of: (A) conceivability implies possibility, (B) I can conceive of God, (C) God is possible, (D) God is actual in some possible world, (E) due to the supreme greatness of God, if God exists is some world then God exists in all worlds, (F) God exists in the actual world?
The eight-legged platypus is certainly a possible being. In fact, this is exactly my point. I’m arguing that regardless of whether or not x actually exists, when you think of an x, you’re also thinking of an x that exists. This is true whether x is God or a lemon or the platypus.
February 7th, 2007 at 12:45 am
I wasn’t disagreeing with you here, I was just trying to see where you were going. I’m interested, in relation to your post, about how to prove that a thing doesn’t exist.
Is possibility enough to ensure that a thing exists? If not, how do we prove that it doesn’t exist? This is why I bought in negative truths, particularly whether negative truths need positive facts.
For example, ‘there are no eight legged platypi’.
Does this negative truth rest on a positive proposition or a negative one? What is the ontological significance of this?
February 7th, 2007 at 1:48 am
Are you asking if something is possible, does that mean it exits? I think not. It seems if x is possible, so is ~x, because if ~x is impossible, than we can conclude x.
I don’t see how proving that something does not exist has anything to do with Anselm’s or my argument. Neither of us are trying to do that.
Why is ‘there are no eight-legged platypi’ a “negative truth?” It’s a proposition, and its truth value is the negation of the truth value of the proposition ‘there are eight-legged platypi’. I’m not sure if these propositions have much ontological significance.
February 7th, 2007 at 7:55 am
No, I was probably extending your article too far. Probably due to a heavy workload on my part. Keep up the great writing and I’ll be back to read your future posts.
February 25th, 2007 at 10:09 pm
I see you’re enjoying Professor Ross’ class. Keep him entertained for me, will you? Thesis writing is going awfully slow for me.
February 27th, 2007 at 5:59 am
Hey Dave
I had a thought while reading yours and Simons discussion…
We have all heard of things that exist, yet we have no experience of them, so do they truly exist for us?
I have heard that there is an animal called a rattlesnake (for example), but I have never seen a real life one. I have seen pictures of one, but as we are all aware we can not believe all pictures we see (the magic of photoshop). So does the rattlesnake actually exist for me?
Well that’s my 2 cents worth anyway.
Waz
February 28th, 2007 at 10:03 pm
As for the eight-legged platypus, I would say that it definitely could exist. When biologists call something a platypus, they mean that it is more like the paradigm-case platypus (the Platonic form of ‘platypus-ness’) than it is like any other creature. So, although platypi are generally thought to be quadrupeds, a mutant octoped platypus (an octo-pus?) is still genetically more like other platypi than it is like any other creature. If, on the other hand, you posit a reptilian platypus, you are probably imagining something so dissimilar that biologists would hesitate to call it a platypus.
Same goes for the paradigm case of “All ravens are black.” See this story:
http://www.ewebtribe.com/NACulture/articles/ADNWhtRavenFbx.htm
February 28th, 2007 at 10:05 pm
I just noticed that I used the phrase “paradigm case” twice in the previous post, and inconsistently, at that.
My bad.
March 8th, 2007 at 5:03 pm
You may be interested in this - http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2007/03/anselms-argument.html
December 15th, 2007 at 6:22 am
very interesting, but I don’t agree with you
Idetrorce
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