David Siegel - The Plenitude of Arboreal Beauty

Theistic arguments from Big Bang cosmology abound, including William Lane Craig’s Kalam argument and L. Stafford Betty and Bruce Cordell’s anthropic teleological argument. Quentin Smith gives an argument which he hopes will fill the lacuna left by non-theistic interpretations of Big Bang cosmology. Smith explains the inherently unpredictable nature of the Big Bang singularity—the lawless instant that gave rise to the Big Bang explosion of the universe—and argues that this fundamental feature of classic Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with the existence of God. Smith derives this inconsistency by arguing that a perfectly benevolent and competent God would not create, as the initial state of a universe which God intends to become animated, a lawless singularity whose maximally chaotic initial conditions would tend towards lifelessness and require immediate and repeated divine intervention to make the eventual development of life physically necessary or even highly probable. After outlining relevant concepts from classic Big Bang cosmology, I will detail Smith’s atheistic argument and some essential responses to it. Then, I will outline Betty and Cordell’s theistic argument from Big Bang cosmology and the anthropic principle and compare it to Smith’s atheistic alternative. Finally, I will use these considerations to discuss the relevance and weight of arguments from Big Bang cosmology as reasons for believing or disbelieving in God.

1. Relevant Concepts from Classic Big Bang Cosmology

Smith’s argument deals with classic Big Bang theory, or the standard “hot Big Bang theory” based on the Friedman models. The relevant concepts Smith introduces to support premises in his atheistic interpretation are the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems and Hawking’s principle of ignorance. The Hawking-Penrose theorems demonstrate the existence of “a singularity intersecting all past-directed spacetime paths” (197); this singular point marks the initial state of the universe, the beginning of space and time, occurring around 15 billion years ago. Hawking’s principle of ignorance describes the lawless nature of the singularity. Smith quotes Hawking,

A singularity is a place where the classical concepts of space and time break down as do all the known laws of physics because they are all formulated on a classical space-time background…This breakdown is not merely a result of our ignorance of the correct theory but…it represents a fundamental limitation…that is analogous but additional to the limitation imposed by the normal quantum-mechanical uncertainty principle. (198)

The unpredictability of the Big Bang singularity indicated by Hawking’s principle is not meant to connote epistemic limits as much as it is meant to demonstrate the absolute lawlessness of the singularity. Since no laws govern the behavior of the singularity, it emits all configurations of particles with equal probability (198). As a result of this completely random outpouring of particle configurations, the early universe is thought to have been in a state of maximal chaos (199). Given the completely random, maximally chaotic initial conditions, the future states of the universe cannot be predicted from the singularity; “there obtain laws connecting [any configuration of particles] C to the configurations occupying later instants but there obtains no law connecting C to the earlier singularity. C adopts a lawful evolution but has its ultimate origin in primordial lawlessness” (199).

2. The Atheistic Argument

Smith begins his atheistic argument from Big Bang cosmology along the same lines as many theistic cosmological arguments: (1) if God exists and there is an earliest state E of the universe, then God created E (200). (2) If God created the earliest state E, then E is ensured either to be an animate state or to lead to a subsequent animate state, because (3) God possesses pure perfections including omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence and (4) an animate universe is better than an inanimate one (200). If God were to create an initial state E that was neither ensured to be animate nor ensured to lead to an animate state, this would amount to God creating a universe that was “not ensured to be of the better sort and [God would thereby] be limited in his benevolence, power, or wisdom” (200), contradicting one or more of God’s pure perfections. The first premise from classic Big Bang cosmology is (5) that there is an earliest state of the universe (E) and it is the Big Bang singularity (Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems). By “universe,” Smith stipulates “the four-dimensional spacetime continuum and any n-dimensional physical state that is earlier or later than the four-dimensional continuum” (200). According to the “hot Big Bang theory,” (6) the earliest state of the universe involves life-hostile conditions of infinite temperature, infinite density, and infinite curvature, and is therefore an inanimate state (200). The second and final premise from Big Bang cosmology is a restatement of Hawking’s principle of ignorance, (7)

The Big Bang singularity is inherently unpredictable and lawless and consequently there is no guarantee that it will emit a maximal configuration of particles [(i.e., a complete state of the universe, the universe as a whole at one time)] that will evolve into an animate state of the universe. (201)

Conjoining the premises derived from the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems and Hawking’s principle of ignorance, Smith shows (8) that the earliest state of the universe is not ensured to evolve into an animate state of the universe. By modus tollens with the second premise, (9) God did not create the earliest state E, because E was neither assured to be animate nor assured to evolve into an animate state. In conclusion, by modus tollens with the first premise, (10) God does not exist, because there exists an earliest state E and God did not create E. Smith does not purport to show that classic Big Bang cosmology is true and therefore God does not exist, but rather that either classic Big Bang cosmology is true, or God exists, and not both.

3. Responses to the Atheistic Argument

Central objections to the atheistic argument and Smith’s responses to these objections are critical for understanding the problems facing Smith’s argument in particular, and the problems facing theistic and atheistic arguments from Big Bang cosmology in general. These problems include the problem of divine intervention, problems posed by infinite quantities, and the problem of counterfactuals true logically prior to creation, among others.

Animate universes are not required by God (201). This objection seeks to invalidate the construction of Smith’s second claim—if God created the earliest state E, then E is ensured either to be an animate state or to lead to a subsequent animate state—by showing the fact that an animate universe is better than an inanimate universe is compatible with God creating, as the earliest state, an event that could have resulted in an inanimate universe. This is demonstrated on the supposition that for each universe U1 there is a better possible universe, U2; consequently, there is no best possible universe, so it is necessary that the actual universe God creates is inferior in some respect to some non-actual universe. Smith responds that what most theologians, including Swinburne, Craig, Leslie, Plantinga, Adams, Morris, etc. (202), mean by “God” puts a minimum constraint on the kind of universe God creates. This constraint is that the universe contain “living creatures” (202). The idea that God has no more reason to create an animate universe than an inanimate universe is inconsistent with “the kind of person we normally conceive God to be” (202) because “it contradicts [God’s] omnibenevolence” (238). Therefore, animate universes are required by God and Smith’s construction of the second premise withstands the objection.

God can intervene to create an animate universe (202). This objection seeks to marginalize Smith’s seventh premise—that the Big Bang singularity was a lawless event (Hawking’s principle of ignorance) and therefore could not be guaranteed to evolve into an animated state of the universe:

…the lawlessness of the Big Bang singularity is not logically incompatible with its being ensured by God to emit a life-producing maximal configuration… For God could intervene at the instant of the singularity and supernaturally constrain the singularity to emit a life-producing configuration. (202)

Smith responds by arguing that divine intervention is incompatible with God’s perfect rationality, for if it is God’s intention to create an animate universe, to begin such a universe with an inherently unpredictable event requiring immediate and repeated divine intervention is a sign of not-perfectly-rational planning (202). One point of agreement for Smith’s atheistic argument and many theistic arguments from Big Bang cosmology is the anthropic principle: if left unaided, the universe would with near certainty have evolved into an inanimate state (203); however, Smith uses the anthropic principle to argue against theism, stating that “if God created the universe with the aim of making it animate, it is illogical that he would have created as its first state something whose natural evolution would lead with high probability only to inanimate states” (203). Smith frames the problem of divine intervention in the face of classic Big Bang cosmology as a set of inconsistent sentences:

1. God is a perfectly rational and perfectly competent creator and he intends to create an animate universe.
2. God creates as the first state of the universe a singularity whose natural tendency is towards lifelessness. (204)

If we adopt both sentences, we are confronted with a paradox in which God creates a universe steered towards the opposite of the one he wanted, and only by interfering with its natural evolution could he ensure that it would lead to the result he desired (206). This contradicts the assumption that God is a perfectly competent creator who does not create things he immediately or subsequently must set right (206). Smith summarizes his atheistic argument to more readily demonstrate the futility of imposing a theory of divine intervention on classic Big Bang cosmology:

if God had created the universe he would have selected [as its first initial state one among countless logically possible initial states that lead by a natural and lawlike evolution to animate states.] Given that the initial state posited by Big Bang cosmology is not one of these states, it follows that Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with the hypothesis of divine creation. (206)

The singularity is a theoretical fiction (207). Stated briefly, the third objection as developed by William Lane Craig is that the Big Bang singularity is “an illegitimate ‘ontologizing’ of a mathematical construct” (212), and therefore has no real existence and should not be considered the initial state of the universe. Craig attempts to map attributes of the singularity onto Cantorian infinite sets in order to disqualify them from being physically real. Smith responds that these infinite attributes of density, temperature, curvature, etc. are not infinite in the Cantorian sense, but rather are arbitrarily large but finite, and “infinite” only insofar as a quantity is called “infinite” when it is a quotient whose denominator is zero (210). For example, the infinite density of matter at the singularity is expressed by the quotient n/0, where n is some large but finite number of kilograms of mass in the universe, and 0 is the volume of the universe at the singularity (210). We call this infinite to account for the impossibility of dividing by zero—this is not to say that the quantity is equal to Cantor’s infinite cardinalities Aleph_0 or Aleph_1. Smith concludes that Craig does not successfully establish a criterion for real existences and demonstrate how the singularity fails to meet such a criterion, and on these grounds Smith dismisses the objection as “an unjustified skepticism about a widely held scientific thesis” (212).

God knows that the singularity will emit a life-producing configuration. The objection is that “the problem of unpredictability would be solved if counterfactuals of singularities were true logically prior to creation” (247). Such counterfactuals include “if a Big Bang singularity were to be the earliest state of the universe, this singularity would emit a life-producing configuration of particles” (213). Smith argues that we do not have an adequate possible world semantics in which to ground a theory of counterfactuals that would make counterfactuals of singularities true logically prior to creation (214-6). Later I offer an objection to Smith’s argument that avoids the divine intervention paradox and does not necessitate a theory of counterfactuals of singularities.

4. A Theistic Argument from Big Bang Cosmology

L. Stafford Betty and Bruce Cordell argue from Big Bang cosmology and the anthropic principle that for the universe to have evolved to an animated state, unaided, from random initial conditions is so improbable that we are justified in positing a Creator who intelligently determined the way these initial conditions turned out. Betty and Cordell cite many features of Big Bang cosmology including the grand unification theory (GUT), the theory that the gravitational, strong, weak, and electro-magnetic forces branched off randomly from an initial, unified force, and ask “could such a universe have unfurled by chance alone? Or was there a mind of indescribable magnitude behind the whole thing?” (Betty 237). Their conclusion supports the theistic alternative, although their argument employs premises similar to those used in Smith’s atheistic argument.

Betty and Cordell first state the anthropic principle: (1) certain features of the universe “could not have been much different from what [they actually are], or otherwise life could not have evolved” (238). The authors substantiate the anthropic principle with examples from Big Bang cosmology including Hubble’s constant governing the rate of the expansion of the universe (238), the strengths of the forces implicated in the GUT, Plank’s constant, etc. (2) The chance that these sensitive features of the universe were stochastically determined from random initial conditions in such a precise way as to result in our life-sustaining universe is infinitesimal, with odds estimated to be “one in 10,000,000,000124” (239). Therefore, (3) if forced to choose between “an unintelligent random process and an invisible Intelligence behind the scenes…a designer may be considered highly probable” (239).

All the while, Betty and Cordell’s argument seems oblivious to the Big Bang singularity. The Big Bang cosmological event that Betty and Cordell discuss “refers, according to latest refinements of the theory, to a time when matter-energy arose out of a condition which is mysterious to us, and will probably always be” (Betty 236). The mysterious condition mentioned here is not mentioned again, but it seems reasonable to suppose that here (and only here) Betty and Cordell are referring to the Big Bang singularity, for it is consistent with the “latest refinements of the theory” to say that the Big Bang explosion of matter-energy arose out of the Big Bang singularity. Furthermore, according to classic Big Bang cosmology, there is no state which could have given rise to the Big Bang explosion other than the Big Bang singularity, and the unresolvable mysteriousness mentioned resonates with Hawking’s principle of ignorance. These considerations strongly suggest that where Betty and Cordell discuss the “Big Bang,” they mean the Big Bang explosion and not the Big Bang singularity.

Betty and Cordell respond to a few technical objections regarding the number of alternative animated universes, the certainty of finding a life-containing universe among an infinite series of universes or among infinite parallel universes, and a quantum-mechanical approach that suggests the universal constants are determined by scientists’ observing them (240). However, the authors do not discuss any objections resembling Smith’s paradox of divine intervention (slightly modified to use Betty and Cordell’s terminology):

1. God is a perfectly [intelligent] creator and he intends to create a [life-sustaining] universe.
2. God creates…a [Big Bang] whose natural tendency is towards lifelessness. (Smith 204)

Smith supposes towards a contradiction that God created the conditions tending towards lifelessness, whereas Betty and Cordell call these conditions “mysterious” (240) and proceed to posit divine intervention without contradiction. Now we see why the “best explanation” for Betty and Cordell is such a frustrating proposition for Smith (italics are original):

God would have to intervene in his creation at the Big Bang singularity to ensure that it emitted a maximal configuration of particles capable of undergoing the symmetry-breaking phases, then again during the GUT era to ensure that the separating gravitational force acquires the right value, and then once again during the electroweak era to ensure that the separating strong force acquires the right value, and then once more during the free quark era to ensure that the separating electromagnetic and weak forces acquire the right value…I have not even mentioned…the interventions required to ensure that the elementary particles acquire the right masses. (205)

Betty and Cordell must account for the mysterious condition out of which the Big Bang as they conceive it arose, for either God is responsible for this condition or it is outside of God’s control; on one hand we question God’s omniscience or competence as a creator, and on the other hand we question God’s omnipotence, suggesting that God was not in control of the beginning of the universe—the exact opposite of what theistic cosmological arguments like Betty and Cordell’s want to show.

Betty and Cordell’s theistic argument from Big Bang cosmology and the anthropic principle concludes that it is more rational to posit an intelligent creator of the universe than to suppose the universe was contrived in a completely random manner. Smith’s atheistic argument from Big Bang cosmology concludes that classic Big Bang theory and God’s existence are incompatible with each other. The conclusions of both arguments are, however, logically consistent; one can consistently agree that God is the most rational explanation for our animate universe and that this fact is incompatible with classic Big Bang cosmology. This is because Smith’s conclusion can equivalently be understood as “if God exists, then classic Big Bang cosmology is wrong.” Thus, we can pose a single question that captures both of these arguments: if we must choose only one option, are we more justified believing in God or believing in classic Big Bang cosmology?

5. Cosmological Considerations and Religious Belief

Before asking “if we must choose only one option, are we more justified believing in God or believing in classic Big Bang cosmology?” we should consider whether or not Smith presents us with a false dilemma. A consideration that suggests that Smith’s argument is unsound, and therefore that classic Big Bang cosmology may be compatible with God’s existence, is that Smith places God in a temporal sequence and this is inconsistent with the traditional Christian conception of God held by most theologians, including Swinburne, Craig, Leslie, Plantinga, etc. (202). From Boethius,

Since, then every judgment comprehends the objects of its thought according to its own nature, and since God has an ever present and eternal state, His knowledge also, surpassing every temporal movement, remains in the simplicity of its own present and, embracing infinite lengths of past and future, views with its own simple comprehension all things as if they were taking place in the present. If you will weigh the foresight with which God discerns all things, you will rightly esteem to to be the knowledge of a never fading instant rather than a foreknowledge of the ‘future.’ (156)

Because this is the conception of God that Smith claims he is working with, he must not suppose that God first intends to create an animate universe, then creates a lawless singularity steered towards lifelessness, and then intervenes to constrain the singularity to emit a life-producing maximal configuration, but rather that God simply comprehends and creates a unitary (for God) lawless-singularity-steered-towards-lifelessness-emitting-a-life-producing-maximal-configuration. This conception of God is compatible with the creation of an animate universe whose initial state is tended towards lifelessness. In this way, we resolve the paradox of divine intervention by showing that what seems like immediate, delayed, or repeated intervention for us is a simple, unitary act of creation for God. Not only does this objection avoid the violations of God’s omniscience and perfect competence inherent in the paradox of divine intervention, this objection applies God’s pure perfections of eternity and simplicity in a more complete picture of God as traditionally conceived.

Even if we accept Smith’s argument as valid, does his conclusion provide reasons for disbelieving in God as strong as the similar but opposite reasons given in Betty and Cordell’s theistic argument? Should cosmological considerations be grounds for disbelieving in God? Smith prefaces his argument with a warning that,

classical Big Bang theory cannot be viewed as the definitive theory of the universe. There are many other competing theories of the universe currently being considered, and some of these have at least as good a claim as the classical theory to be regarded as ‘the best currently available theory’ and ‘the theory we should provisionally accept…’ (196)

Because there are other, equally likely cosmologies contending with classic Big Bang cosmology, it is reasonable to say that if one believes that God does not exist on the basis of Smith’s argument alone, “the belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence [and] the pleasure is a stolen one” (Clifford 108). Smith would probably agree with this because his primary aim is to “[counteract] the theistic interpretation of [the] classical theory” (197) rather than to convince us that God does not exist.

Betty and Cordell, on the other hand, argue that regardless of the non-theistic cosmological theory in consideration, it is always more rational to posit an intelligent, supernatural creator than to suppose the universe came about naturally. Among the modern cosmologies under consideration by science—classic Big Bang theory, inflationary theories, vacuum-fluctuation theories, branching-universe theories—none strikes us as particularly rational. They all involve insights that bend the mind and are so close to being incomprehensible that it takes years of arduous research conducted by some of the world’s greatest minds in mathematics and physics to create just the beginnings of a theory. These experts are more concerned that their theories conform to mathematical models predicted by general relativity and quantum mechanics than to some criterion of rational acceptability. So, it may be more rational to posit a supernatural creator than to suppose the universe came about naturally, but the weight of this conclusion is minimized if we accept that if the universe came about naturally, then it came about in some manner that is not readily rationally acceptable. On these grounds Betty and Cordell’s appeals to our “intuition” (236) lose much of their force because it is suggested that the rational acceptability of a hypothesis is not as strongly correlated to the truth of that hypothesis as the authors’ theistic argument assumes.

I have detailed Smith’s atheistic argument from classic Big Bang cosmology, and I have offered an objection that makes a perfectly rational and benevolent God consistent with the creation of an animate universe whose initial state tends with high probability towards lifelessness. Also, after discussing Betty and Cordell’s theistic argument from Big Bang cosmology and the anthropic principle and comparing it to Smith’s atheistic alternative, I have concluded that neither argument is grounds for believing or disbelieving in God.

Works Cited

Betty, L. Stafford and Bruce Cordell. “The Anthropic Teleological Argument.” Philosophy of Religon: selected readings. Ed. Michael Peterson et al. New York: Oxford, UP, 2007. 235-46.

Boethius. “God is Timeless.” Philosophy of Religon: selected readings. Ed. Michael Peterson et al. New York: Oxford UP, 2007. 155-8.

Clifford, William. “The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy of Religon: selected readings. Ed. Michael Peterson et al. New York: Oxford, UP, 2007. 104-9.

Smith, Quentin. “Atheism, Theism, and Big Bang Cosmology.” Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Ed. William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. 197-217.

Smith, Quentin. “A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for God’s Non-existence.” Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Ed. William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. 232-55.