David Siegel - The Plenitude of Arboreal Beauty

Pursuant of a psychology, a moral science, and ultimately a civil science, all grounded in a materialist worldview, Thomas Hobbes defines “good” and “evil” in terms of the individual subject’s particular appetites and aversions. These appetites and aversions correspond to pleasures and pains arising within the body in reaction to external matter in motion. Hobbes believes that as much as one person differs in composition from another, that person may differ just as much in what he considers to be good or evil (HN 44). This leads immediately to the objection that using Hobbes’s definitions of “good” and “evil,” there is no objective measure of good and evil; therefore, Hobbes has constructed a value theory of moral relativism. In addition, one might bring the same objections brought against Jeremy Bentham’s theory of utilitarianism against Hobbes, for Hobbes’s definitions of good and evil can be spelled out in terms of pleasure and pain, and Hobbes even makes some proto-utilitarian remarks about a calculus for distinguishing greater and lesser goods and evils. I will give Hobbes’s formulation of the definitions of “good” and “evil” and explain why he must deduce them from matter in motion. Then, I will respond to the first objection by suggesting that charges of moral relativism stem from a misunderstanding of Hobbes’s project, and that there is room for consensus about more important goods and evils. Finally, I will discuss the objections to Hobbes’s proto-utilitarianism and why they are not a problem for Hobbes.

The formulation of Hobbes’s definitions of good and evil proceeds by a small number of simple steps from the material foundations of his philosophy. From the matter in motion that composes the world, we receive “the sense of an object…[which] comes from the reaction or resistance that is made by an organ [of sense to matter in motion]” (MC 45). Matter in motion causes motion in our sense organs through physical interaction. Motion in our sense organs, or “sense,” gives rise to “conceptions and apparitions” (HN 43), which are simply “motion in some internal substance of the head” (HN 43). Motion in the head proceeds to the heart, where the motion “of necessity must there either help or hinder that motion which is called vital” (HN 43). When vital motion—motion of the heart—is helped, the causal sequence beginning in the object and reaching the heart is called “pleasure;” when vital motion is hindered, the sequence is called “pain.”

This motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is also a solicitation or provocation either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth. And this solicitation is the endeavor or internal beginning of animal motion, which when the object delighteth, is called appetite; when it displeaseth, it is called aversion. (HN 44)
Hobbes explains that we have an appetite for the object which causes pleasure in us; oppositely, we have an aversion to the object which causes pain in us. In conclusion, Hobbes states that “good” and “evil” are names for our appetites and aversions, respectively.

Hobbes defines good and evil in this way because he is laying the groundwork for his psychology. His psychology employs the concepts of hope, fear, glory, humility, dejection, and all other “passions of the mind;” each passion of the mind is derived either from some more basic passion already defined, or from good or evil. In order to conduct a scientific treatment of psychology consistent with his materialism, each passion of the mind must ultimately trace back to matter in motion. Due to the derivation of the passions of the mind from the concepts of good and evil, Hobbes must derive his concepts of good and evil from matter in motion; otherwise his psychology and his subsequent philosophy will be groundless.

The first objection that must be addressed is that Hobbes’s definitions of good and evil lead to moral relativism; since all subjects signify different things by the terms “good” and “evil,” there is no objective measure of good and evil. Here is perhaps the most incendiary excerpt that would prompt an objection along these lines:

Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as [simply good]. For even the goodness which we attribute to God Almighty, is his goodness to us. (HN 44)

The objection is that Hobbes has constructed a value theory of moral relativism because he makes each subject an equal arbiter of good and evil. This is problematic if one believes that there are objectively good things, such as God, or objectively evil things, such as war, that should be considered either good or evil independent of the subject. For Hobbes, there is nothing that is “simply good,” by which he means good independent of a sensing subject; similarly, there is nothing “simply evil.” He claims that even in the case of “God Almighty,” the good that we attribute to God is what we would call a secondary quality—by the words “good X” and “evil X,” we signify something about our experience of X rather than something about X itself. The experience of the same object differs between subjects, and Hobbes attributes these differences of experience to differences in the material “constitution” of the subjects.

Calling Hobbes a moral relativist betrays a misunderstanding of Hobbes’s project; Hobbes defines “good” and “evil” expressly for the purpose of building his psychology firmly upon the material foundations of his science. Hobbes is not concerned with objects themselves, but rather with subjects of experience. Where he writes “even the goodness which we attribute to God Almighty, is his goodness to us” (HN 44), he is making a statement about the nature of our experience, not about the nature of God. If he were making a statement about God’s nature, he would have written “even the goodness that is God Almighty’s is the goodness which we attribute to him.” Hobbes does not write this because it is not part of his project. Therefore, I think the objection of moral relativism stems in part from a failure to distinguish good and evil as secondary qualities from good and evil as primary qualities; Hobbes is concerned only with the former. Although he denies that good is a primary quality, I read Hobbes as simply intending to delineate what follows from his science from what does not.

Defining “good” and “evil” in terms of the subject’s experience also might lead one to call Hobbes’s psychology one of rational egoism—this may be a more appropriate appellation than “moral relativist.” Hobbes writes that because self-preservation is our fundamental interest, “it is necessary to desire life, health, and further, insofar as it can be done, security of future time” (MC 48). While this expresses the view that people are fundamentally self-interested, it also states that there are things that are necessarily desirable, and therefore necessarily good. If we do not take this to contradict what Hobbes writes about nothing being “simply good,” we must understand it to mean that there is room for intersubjectivity, or unanimous consensus about some goods.

Objections similar to those brought against Bentham’s utilitarianism can be made against Hobbes’s definitions of good and evil, since Hobbes’s definitions are directly correlated to physical pleasure and pain. Hobbes fails to distinguish between higher and lower goods, and he offers a crude “goodness calculus” that leads to all sorts of absurdities:

If good and evil be compared, other things being equal, the greater is that which lasts longer, as the whole is to the part. And other things being equal, that which is stronger, for the same reason. For the larger and stronger differ as greater and less. And, other things being equal, what is good for more is greater than what is good for fewer. For the more general and the more particular differ as greater and less. (MC 53)

Hobbes makes no distinction between higher and lower goods, where higher goods exercise reason and are therefore categorically preferable to lower goods, and lower goods are simply the satisfaction of animal desires such as sex and thirst. His heuristics for determining which goods or evils are greater lead to some startling results: if the longer lasting good is the greater good, then a ten-day massage is a greater good than a one-hour massage; and if the more general good is the greater good, then CocaCola is a greater good than wine. Hobbes is concerned with the appetites of the individual subject, and he would respond by saying that if one has a greater appetite for sex and CocaCola than for philosophy and wine, than those things are greater goods for that person. It seems as if Hobbes’s words stand up even to these objections, for the moment you disagree and say that what is good for you is not good, or what is evil for you is not evil, your appetites or aversions have changed.

Beginning from matter in motion and building up from there, Hobbes defines “good” and “evil” in terms of the individual subject’s appetites and aversions. As I have discussed, it is easy to take issue with Hobbes’s definitions, but ultimately I agree with them.